A patent misuse defence requires more than a mere allegation of anticompetitive conduct.
In the late 1990s Princo entered into a package licence agreement with Philips to manufacture CDs and import them into the US. However, soon after entering into the agreement, Princo stopped paying the licensing fees. Philips filed a complaint against Princo with the International Trade Commission, alleging that Princo violated 19 USC §1337(a)(1)(B) by importing CD-Rs and CD-RWs that infringed Philips' patents. See In re Certain Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,948 (ITC 26 July 2002) .
In response to Philips' assertions of patent infringement, Princo raised a patent misuse defence based on the theory that, in order to obtain a licence to the patents that were necessary to manufacture CD-R and CD-RW products, Philips forced Princo and other licensees to obtain licences to other patents that were not necessary to manufacture the CD-R and CD-RW products.
Although the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that various claims of six asserted Philips US patents were infringed by Princo and were not invalid, Philips was nonetheless denied relief because the ALJ also found that that the patents were unenforceable due to patent misuse. In particular, the ALJ found that the Philips package licence was an improper tying arrangement, and that the Philips patents were unenforceable due to price fixing, price discrimination, and acts in restraint of trade.
On Philips' petition for review, the International Trade Commission ('the Commission') affirmed the ALJ's ruling that Philips' package licence constituted patent misuse for unlawfully tying patents that were essential for the Orange Book standards to licences for other patents that were not essential. However, the Commission did not address the ALJ's rulings that the patent pooling arrangements between Philips and its co-licensors, including Sony, constituted price fixing and price discrimination, or the ALJ's ruling that the royalty structure of the patent pools resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. See In re Certain Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474 (ITC 25 Mar. 2004 ) ('Princo I'). The Federal Circuit reversed Philips I on appeal, rejecting the ALJ's tying theory on the grounds that Philips merely charged others a fixed licensing fee in exchange for the right to manufacture CDs under the Orange Book standards. See U.S. Philips Corp. v ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005 ) ('Princo II').
In Princo II, the Federal Circuit recognized that Philips gave its licensees the option to use any patents in the package, and did not require any of the patents in the package licence to be used. Princo II also recognized that charging one licensing fee had the advantages of minimizing transaction costs and ensuring against the risk of post-agreement disputes as to whether additional patents were required to practise the patented technology. Princo II also rejected the Commission's rule of reason analysis as being based on legal errors and unsupported factual findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address the remaining grounds on which the ALJ based his rulings.
On remand, the Commission rejected Princo's remaining theories of patent misuse based on Rather,Princo II addresses whether Princo's assertion that the agreement between Philips and Sony to include the Lagadec patent in the Orange Book constituted patent misuse as a purported horizontal agreement between two competitors to suppress competing technology.
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Bryson, and joined by Chief Judge Rader and Judges Newman, Lourie, Linn and Moore, rejected this theory and crafted a narrow view of the doctrine of patent misuse. In particular, the majority confirmed that not every antitrust violation gives rise to a patent misuse claim. Rather, patent misuse requires a connection between the allegedly anticompetitive conduct and the patent-in-suit.
Further, the majority confirmed that patent misuse requires proof of anticompetitive effect. Since Princo's claim established neither a sufficient connection between the patent-in-suit and the allegedly anticompetitive conduct nor a reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect, the majority affirmed the dismissal of Princo's claim.
Judge Prost authored a separate concurring opinion, which was joined by Judge Mayer. Judges Prost and Mayer agreed that the facts of this case did not establish any anticompetitive effects, but declined to reach the broader issues.
Judge Dyk authored a dissenting opinion, in which Judge Gajarsa joined, that would have reached the conclusion that the existence of an antitrust violation-in the form of an agreement to suppress an alternative technology designed to protect a patented technology from competition-constitutes patent misuse.
This current intelligence provides a summary of the rationale applied by the majority to find that Princo failed to establish a patent misuse defence.
The Princo II majority began its substantive discussion of the doctrine of patent misuse by reviewing the leading US Supreme Court cases on point and the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. §274(d), which limits the availability of the defence. As the majority recognized, the doctrine of patent misuse is a judicially created defence that has its roots in a series of US Supreme 1. requiring the purchase of an unpatented product as a condition for obtaining a licence to a patented product; and 2. requiring the payment of licensing fees after the expiration of the licensed patent and thus having the effect of extending the life of the patent beyond the statutory period.
In reviewing the Federal Circuit's prior statements on the doctrine of patent misuse, the Princo II majority states, 'we have characterized patent misuse as the patentee's act of "impermissibly broaden[ing] the 'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect." ' [Id. at *21-22, citing Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986 ).]
Thus the Princo II majority summarized the essence of a patent misuse claim as follows:
"It follows that the key inquiry under the patent misuse doctrine is whether, by imposing the condition in question, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant and has done so in a manner that has anticompetitive effects. Where the patentee has not leveraged its patent beyond the scope of rights granted by the Patent Act, misuse has not been found. (Id. at *23-24 (citation omitted).)"
Significantly, the Princo II majority adopted a narrow view of the patent misuse defence:
"Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that the defence of patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may have anticompetitive effects. … While proof of an antitrust violation shows that the patentee has committed wrongful conduct having anticompetitive effects, that does not establish misuse of the patent in suit unless the conduct in question restricts the use of that patent and does so in one of the specific ways that have been held to be outside the otherwise broad scope of the patent grant. (Id. at *25-26.)"
In other words, to establish a patent misuse defence, not only must the proponent of the defence establish some kind of wrongful conduct that has anticompetitive effects, but he must also establish that the wrongful conduct is tied to the patent sought to be enforced: 'What that requires, at minimum, is that the patent in suit must "itself significantly contribute[] to the practice under attack." Patent misuse will not be found when there is "no connection" between the patent right and the misconduct in question, or no "use" of the patent.' [Id. at *34-35 (citation omitted)]. In the Princo II majority's discussion of the narrow application of the patent misuse defence, it also turned to 35 USC §271(d), which it found was enacted by Congress to 'cabin in', not 'broaden', the defence. In In sum, the Princo II majority confirmed that a patent misuse defence is a narrow, judicially created defence to be applied where a patentee improperly seeks to broaden the physical or temporal scope of a patent through anticompetitive conduct which is directly connected to broadening the scope of the patent and has an anticompetitive effect. Since Princo failed to establish that the conduct it complained of was directly connected to broadening the scope of the patent (either physically or temporally), and failed to establish an anticompetitive effect, its assertion of a patent misuse defence was rejected.
Practical significance
It has become common in at least the consumer electronics industry for competitors to jointly establish standards for new products, and to create pools of patents that relate to such standards. Princo II recognizes the procompetitive effects that such arrangements can 
